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CREATIVE LEGAL RESEARCH: RELEVANT USES FOR AN OLD
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM
REGINALD

H.

ALLEYNE, JR.*

n 1970, the case method of studying law turned 100 years of age.
Although the passage of time has prompted increasing reexamination of its value as a teaching device, critical commentary on the
subject -is nothing new. Dean Langdell's then startling new teaching method at the Harvard Law School has been the subject of
criticism from its inceptidn in 1870. In 1872, the Boston University Law School was founded, among other reasons, as a means of
protesting the new case method.' Jerome Frank's earliest critical
writings on the subject appeared in 1933;2 his latest, in 1949.3 In
1951, Professor Edwin Patterson offered an incisive appraisal of
the case method's advantages and disadvantages.4 In 1967, when he
could then note that the case method was "almost 100 years old,"
Dean Erwin Griswold chose the law school case method as his farewell topic on retiring as Dean of the Harvard Law School.5 Professor Arthur Kinoy, in a 1969 article, called for a departure from
100 years of tradition and a change to more realistic ways of igniting latent student interests."
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California Law School, Los Angeles. B.S.,
Tufts University, 1954; LL.B., Howard University, 1959; LL.M., Columbia University,
1969.
1.

HARvARD LAw SCHOOL ASS'N, CENTENNIAL

HISrORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

26 (1918). See Griswold, Intellect and Spirit, 81 HARv. L. REv. 292, 295 (1967).
Dean Langdell's case method ultimately prevailed at the Boston University Law
School. In 1896, a writer on the school's history said: "The aim of the school is to teach
principles rather than mere cases; yet cases are always cited to illustrate the principles
and fix them in the memory, while a few of the cases in each branch, which have become landmark cases in the law are especially examined and commented upon." Albers,
The Boston University School of Law, 1 BOSTON L. SCHOOL MAG. 7 (1896).
2. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933); Frank,
What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?, 19 A.B.AJ. 723 (1933).
3. Frank, A Plea for Lawyer Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 303 (1947). Judge Frank's book,
COURTS ON TRIAL, published in 1949, includes a chapter on legal education which collates
many of his earlier articles.
4. Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal Education: Its Origins and
Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1951).
5. Griswold, Intellect and Spirit, 81 HARv. L. REv. 292 (1967).
6. Kinoy, The Present Crisis in American Legal Education, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 1
(1969).
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There has been much interim writing.7 By the sixties, some
writings on the subject were taking on the hue of nostalgic reflections on how the author's view of some years ago failed to attract
attention. 8 The outpouring goes on unabated and has indeed increased in tempo recently as new concerns, reflected in a new student mood, by a new kind of law student body, begin to change the
inner character of law schools and to generate pressures for institutional change. What the editors of a recent casebook had to say
about the quantity of writing on Erie R.R. v. Tompkins holds
true for articles on the case method of teaching law: enough has
been written on the subject "to sink it without a trace."0
The quantitative measure of these writings illustrates the
law school case method's outstanding quality of durability. Pilloried for a century, it stands virtually unchanged from the seminal
form it was given by Dean Langdell 100 years ago. Pleas for reform, distinguished not only by their numbers but by the reformers' eminence as well, have not made their mark. The case7. See, e.g., Robertson, Some Suggestions on Student Boredom in English and
American Law Schools, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 278 (1968); Friendly, The Idea of a Metropolitan
Law School, 19 Case W. R.s. L. REV. 7 (1967); McClain, Legal Education: Extent to
Which "Know-How" in Practice Should be Taught in the Law Schools, 6 J. LEGAL ED.
302 (1954); Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 CoLUm.
L. REV. 651 (1935). This is but a miniscule sample of writings on the subject.
8. In 1943, Professors Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell of the Yale Law
School wrote:
We submit this basic proposition: If legal education in the contemporary world
is adequately to serve the needs of a free and productive commonwealth, it
must be conscious, efficient and systematic training for policy-making. The
proper function of our law schools is, in short, to contribute to the training
of policy-makers for the evermore complete achievement of the democratic
values that constitute the professed ends of American polity.
Lasswell &- McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Teaching
in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (1943). Of this, Professor Richard E.
Speidel, twenty-five years later, was able to say:
Of the countless words written about legal education, these are among the
boldest and most widely discussed. No single proposal for reform discards so
much of the traditional or places greater demands upon the student, the teacher,
and the educational institution. . . . Yet time has passed without action, and
the law school curriculum looks about the same.
Speidel, A Matter of Mission, 54 VA. L. REv. 606 (1968).
The Speidel article is one of several in a legal education symposium in honor of
Dean Hardy C. DUllard. All contributors were asked to focus on the famous McDougalLasswell article of 1943. A common theme runs through the symposium articles: most
proposals for change in the law school curriculum, like the McDougal-Lasswell proposals,
have not been adopted. See A Symposium in Honor of Hardy C. Dillard: Legal Educa.
tion, 54 VA. L. REV. 583 (1968).
9. M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, & H. SMIT, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES
AND MATERIALS

35 (2d ed. 1970),
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book's staple is still the appellate case. We find more extracts from
law review articles today, more extensive editing of cases, more use
of summary notes, even an occasional comic strip,1 but these all
remain somewhat ancillary to the undergirding force of A v. B, as
decided by the highest court of State X. With one possible exception, a compilation of cases "based on office records" and designed
to teach students "what actually goes on in a law office," has not
yet been produced.-' Nor has any law school shifted to the type of
curriculum proposed by Jerome Frank in his writings on the
desirability of clinical law schools. 2
Despite all that has been said in the past, the law school curriculum remains a vital topic of discussion, and a very legitimate
source of inquiry and debate by legal educators; for those now
seeking change have an important and catalytic ally in the student
body. Largely as a result of student pressures, law schools are beginning to experiment with the curriculum. Most offer at least one
clinical course, 13 and the move by some states to permit law students
to make court appearances under appropriate supervision offers
possibilities beyond those envisioned by the most passionate clinicians.' 4

To cite any one reason as the principal cause of student dissatisfaction at a time when the entire university system is experiencing a complex series of external and internal crises, would be sim10.

E. THODE, L.
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MAZOR,
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71 (1970).

11. The suggestion that edited law office papers be used as a source of casebook
material was made by Dean Edwin Griswold, supra note 1, at 303.
The one published casebook coming dose to this approach is Professor Hlarrop
Freeman's casebook, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1964). See Weihofen, Book
Review, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 709 (1965); Malone, Book Review, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 111 (1965);
Book Note, 18 VAND. L. REv. 870 (1965).
12. See materials cited notes 2 and 3 supra.
13. See Johnstone, Law School Legal Aid Clinics, 3 J. LEGAL ED. 535 (1951). Some
of the more novel clinical courses are those which attempt to impart skills in counseling
and interviewing. See Sacks, Human Relations Training for Law Students and Lawyers,
11 J. LEGAL ED. 316 (1959); Katz, The Law And Behavioral Science Program At Yale:
A Psychiatrist's First Impressions, 12 J. LEGAL En. 99 (1959); Schwartz, The Law And
Behavioral Science Program at Yale: A Sociologist's Account of Some Experiences, 12 J.
LEGAL Eo. 91 (1959).
14. E.g., Rules for Practical Training of Law Students, adopted by the California
State Bar Board of Governors, authorizes attorney-supervised law students to counsel
clients and make appearances before courts, referees, commissioners, hearing officers and
public agencies. The rules require the presence of the supervising attorney in trials
before the superior or appellate courts of California and in all criminal matters. STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA REPORTS, Feb., 1970.
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plistic and inaccurate. To single out student dissatisfaction with
law school at a time when there is campus-wide unrest might
appear parochial. But law schools occupy a rather unique role on
campus. In times of extraordinary campus crisis, they are looked to
for roles of leadership. Further, a vast majority of future members
of Congress, the Senate and state legislatures are now, have been
or will be law students, and nearly 100% of both the state and
federal judiciary of the future now attend, have attended or will
attend law schools in the United States. Whatever the cause of
campus-wide student discontent, the student mood in schools of
law is particularly worthy of an attempt at analysis, notwithstanding all that has been said, to little or no avail, in the past.
On the subject of curricular reform, dialogue between law
school faculties and student bodies sometimes proves difficult because of a fundamental failure of student and faculty minds to
meet. Educators' discourse on the nature of the law school curriculum goes to its form, to a method of teaching. They ask, for
example, whether the law schools should approach schools of medicine in the degree to which what is taught has a bearing on what
is practiced in the profession. 15 Hardly any legal educators suggest
that property and torts be dropped from the curriculum; it is the
manner in which they and other subjects are taught which stirs
debate in the law journals. Mutterings along similar lines echo in
law school student lounges-familiar complaints of not knowing
where the courthouse is, of not knowing how to draft a lease or how
to present evidence at trial. But the underlying reasons for the
new law student mood run much deeper in the student psyche.
More so perhaps than other students in the university community,
law students question the ability of the legal system to respond to
legitimate societal grievances.
As a response to law student dissatisfaction with law school
studies, it might be tempting to argue for an increase in the now
experimental clinical offerings; to substitute a revolutionary change
in the curriculum for change by the slower process of evolution;
to go all the way with Jerome Frank's scathing denunciation of the
15. On this topic, Jerome Frank was characteristically adamant: "A medical school
dominated by teachers who had seldom seen a patient, or diagnosed the ailments of
flesh-and-blood human beings, or acually performed surgical operations, would not be
likely to turn out doctors equipped with a fourth part of what doctors ought to know.
But our la w schools are not doing for their students even the equivalent of that shoddy
job." J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 232 (1949).
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Langdell case method. I think this would be far wide of the mark
and not at all responsive to legitimate student discontent, particularly that which afflicts students in the second and third years of
law school when the flush of the first year's excitement has passed
and unmitigated boredom sets in, pervasively and intractably.:,
In his article, The Present Crisis in American Legal Education,17 Professor Arthur Kinoy links the new law student mood
with an underlying crisis in the legal profession:
How can law and a profession whose life is based upon law's
existence, remain relevant to the pressing and fundamental problems of contemporary American society; for example, the seemingly unending misery of a colonial war which has warped and
distorted the very moral fabric of the nation; the urban crisis
and the exploding upheavals of our black citizens demanding fulfillment of rights 300 years overdue, or the increasing threats to
the existence of the most elementary democratic liberties of the
American people?' 8
The new catchword, almost reduced now to a cliche, is relevancy.
In the current student lexicon, what part of the law school curriculum is relevant to the needs of any but corporate and other

institutional interests?
Professor Kinoy correctly rejects any notion that mere mechanical changes in curricular form might be a panacea for these
student concerns. His response is to involve law students in "creative" lawsuits; to use law schools as clinical centers for this involvement, as he did in his and Professor Herbert 0. Reid's eminently
successful brief for Congressman Powell in Powell v. McCormack.19
He advocates that law schools use such cases as a medical student
uses a laboratory or clinic.

Professor Kinoy would add to Judge Frank's arguments for
structural changes in the method of teaching an effort to seek out
and teach from those cases which stimulate and excite. Although
he quotes liberally from Judge Frank's writings, I think Judge

Frank's concerns were quite different from those of Professor
Kinoy. Judge Frank was concerned not so much with the sub16. See Robertson, Some Suggestions on Student Boredom in English and American
Law Schools, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 278 (1968); Gellhorn, The Second and Third Years of Law
Study, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1964).
17. 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1969).
18. Id. at 2, 3.
19. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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stantive content of the law school curriculum as he was with the
form of law school instruction. He believed in a clinically structured law school as a means of bridging a gap between theory
and practice-the dull practice, I suspect, as well as the exciting
practice. 2 Certainly in the thirties and forties, when Jerome Frank
did most of his writing, American courts were not handing down
with anything like regularity, decisions like Baker v. Carr2' Dom2 2 and Reitman v. Mulkey.2 3 During that time, a
browski v. Pfister

writer could not seriously advocate linking law school clinics with
the kinds of cases now characterized as exciting and creative, and
to which law schools might attach themselves through the conduit
of a law school clinic.
The Kinoy article has refreshing insight in calling for a new
emphasis in subject matter as well as a new approach in presenting
it. But I have some difficulties with an emphasis on live case material which has an inherent capacity to excite. Obviously, a law
teacher-indeed, any teacher-would be seriously remiss in his or
her duties in failing to grasp every opportunity to stimulate students. One difficulty, though, with satisfying student craving for
"relevancy" is that relevancy in the student context is too often
equated with inherently exciting subject matter. It might well
be that all "relevant" cases are exciting; but surely, not all unexciting cases are irrelevant. How many cases of cardinal importance
to alienated Americans fail to attract the public spirited legal
craftsman because they lack that quick capacity to trigger the
intellect and fire the imagination? In the law schools, how much of
what is offered merely gives an appearance of irrelevancy? And how
much of that still appears irrelevant after it is taught?
More and more one hears from young lawyers connected with
poverty law agencies such remarks as, "I have a welfare case, but it
boils down to a trust problem; and I wish I knew more about
trusts." 24 Examples of "relevant" uses for "irrelevant" law school

courses abound.
20. See material cited notes 2 and 3 supra.
21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
22. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
24. The case is Oudin v. California, No. 964306 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., filed Oct.
31, 1969), a suit by a legal services agency, The Western Center on Law and Poverty,
to restrain enforcement of revised state welfare regulations which required invasion of
educational trust funds. A temporary restraining order has been issued. No. 96-4306 (Los
Angeles, Super. Ct., granted Oct. 31, 1969).
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Last summer a group of young law students obtained proxy
votes enabling them to appear at a General Motors shareholders'
meeting to question GM's management policies as they affect the
poor, including the question of black representation on General
Motors' Board of Directors.2 5 In 1968, a black clergyman in Philadelphia set up a community development corporation, which multiplied $250,000 of its own equity into a four million dollar investment in the black community and ultimately created a federallyfinanced, low-income housing project, a shopping center, an aerospace components company, and a garment manufacturing company. In 1966, a court of appeals decided that cleaning women in
a leased portion of a bank-owned building in Savannah, Georgia
were covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act and entitled to receive the minimum wage and overtime pay required by that Act.
In 1969, the Department of Labor recovered from a Mississippi
farmer $50,000 in back wages due 200 laborers whom the farmer
had charged $70.00 per month rent for wooden shacks found to
have a true rental value of $5.00 per month.28
All of these cases have a common thread: they involve a poor
person, a black person, or both, either as a party to the immediate
action or as an eventual beneficiary of the action taken. At the
same time, the result in each case hinges on the resolution of
issues arising in areas of the law which would not pass muster
today as relevant or exciting.
Today, a corps of young legal services lawyers does not realize
until after leaving law school that the basic staple of the law school
curriculum must often be heavily relied upon in poverty and civil
rights cases. Law schools would be more exciting and useful places
if this could be driven home throughout law school. But apart
from the obviously "relevant" law school courses, few are taught
with an emphasis on their potential for use in poverty or civil
rights litigation.
25. See Maeroff, Stinging the Corporations, NAT oN, June 22, 1970, at 17; Tim
NEW YoRKER, June 20, 1970, at 40-51.
26. Note, Community Development Corporations: Operations and Financing, 83
HI-tv. L. Ruv. 1558, 1562-67 (1970). The operations and financing of three other community development corporations are described in the article.
27. Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1966); see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
28. 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. (Wages-Hours) ff 3004 (1969).
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It is not entirely the fault of law teachers that the relevancy of
some subjects, or aspects of some subjects, does not become apparent until a young civil rights, poverty, or other public service
lawyer encounters a live case in which he is compelled to conjure
up from the farthest recesses of his mind a vital portion of a course
once looked upon as deeply esoteric. Only during the last five years
have funded law agencies provided a firm corps of lawyers to
handle on a sustained basis the types of cases which do not generate
the fees required to maintain a law office. 29 These cases have produced a body of law sometimes loosely referred to as "poverty
law," as though a new body of substantive law has evolved, when
in fact the few casebooks on the subject merely bring together
those legal disciplines which have long had an identifiable effect
on the poor: constitutional law, employment discrimination law,
housing discrimination law, family law, and consumer credit law. 0
Without providing much that is substantively new, these publications merely collate subject matter which has escaped the "irrelevant" label. But there is room for much more. In addition to collating decisions now affecting the poor, law teachers and students
might undertake a far more creative role.
Many of the landmark cases like Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corporation of Bay View, 1 are those in which the aggrieved individual was a defendant; someone wanted something which defendant did not want to give up, like the garnished wages in Sniadach,
the new automobile or the furniture in a typical repossession case,
life and liberty in a criminal case, the right to shelter in a landlord-tenant case. Certainly the efforts of lawyers in these cases
should continue. But the nation's number one domestic problem,
the growing black-white schism, needs more than a legal rearguard
defensive action; it requires the channeling of more academic legal
talent to affirmative types of lawsuits aimed at the root causes rather
than the symptoms of the awful plight of the nation's two largest
minority groups-blacks and Mexican-Americans.
Courses which are relevant and not exciting by student standards should be taught with an emphasis on their potential for rele29.

Most legal services agencies are precluded from accepting "fee-generating" cases.

30. E.g., P. DODYK, LAW AND POVERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS (1969). A new "Social
Justice Through Law" series collates cases of social significance in the areas of civil
procedure, contracts and property. E.g., H. SEMNMEL, SOCIAL JUsTicE THROUGH LAW: NEW
APPROACHES IN THE LAIW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

31. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).

(1970).
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vancy, not only with respect to the nation's priority race problem,
but the secondary problems of the quality of life in America, the
environment, and urban decay, as well. It seems hardly necessary
to wait for a case to walk into a law office and become, by happenstance, a novel and creative case. The ideas for such actions can be
generated in an atmosphere of intellectual excitement in the law
schools today. Potential poverty and civil rights uses for antitrust
laws, the securities laws, the tax laws, the communications laws,
and many other previovisly untapped sources can be exploited by
scholars and students. All that awaits is for existing energies, ,concerns and will, to be combined with expertise and sublimated to a
new path.
In what ways, for example, might the antitrust statutes be
used to effectively eliminate conspiracies by powerful real estate
broker groups to keep white neighborhoods white? Those who are
not antitrust lawyers may have no answer; and antitrust lawyers
may have no answer on the tips of their tongues because they have
not turned their thoughts from the traditional topics with which
antitrust lawyers are ordinarily concerned. Scholars in the field
might research this question and make the results known to legal
services attorneys and other public interest attorneys in a position
to file the necessary suits.
What, if any, legal remedies might exist for blacks victimized
by a governmental anti-inflation policy which, through various
forms of executive and administrative action, accepts high unemployment rates as a price for a reduction in inflationary trends at a
time when the rate of black unemployment in the United States is
invariably twice the rate of white unemployment? Obvious problems of justiciability, executive discretion, the identification of a
class of injured parties, and the appropriate parties to join as
defendants, might appear at first blush-and indeed might well be
-insurmountable. But these are fluid concepts, and it would be
intriguing to see the strongest possible arguments on both sides of
the question, in the form of a draft complaint, an answer, motions
for summary judgment and supporting briefs, all prepared by students and faculty members in a joint venture of creative research
cutting across the legal disciplines of administrative law, constitutional law, civil procedure and federal jurisdiction. It would be
intriguing to see how the growing vanguard of legal services and
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other public spirited lawyers might use the product of that effort.
If the courts are not ready to entertain an action like this today,
what of tomorrow?
For the moment, the merits of these two problems can be put
aside. They are offered as examples of the kinds of new uses to
which old subjects might be put, as examples of a different kind of
research for new and important reasons. The difference between
this research activity and traditional legal research is the new
emphasis on issues not within the context of a real case, but well
within the context of a potential case; a new emphasis on novel
issues which might remain unnoticed and unthought of but for
the work of concerned law teachers and students using each other
as participating researchers or as product critics.
The machinery for this activity exists within the law schools.
Law teachers produce hypothetical cases for examinations; teachers
and students produce hypothetical cases for moot court arguments.
Every teacher of law has witnessed student enthusiasm for a moot
court brief-writing effort-a product of a deeply ingrained student
desire to be creative. Creative research might go further in exploiting that desire, for it would combine satisfaction of the creative instinct with the admirable, but unsatisfied student desire to
make an effective contribution to the alleviation of America's social
ills.
To accomplish this, a large faculty effort would be required,
particularly in those legal disciplines not ordinarily associated with
social causes. Research in the traditional way of analyzing the
implications of the case of A v. B, as decided by an appellate court,
is now the norm. Turning expertise in communications law, securities law, trade regulation, taxation, and others, from the normal
concerns of those areas might prove difficult. While every creative
research effort will not ultimately translate to a landmark court
decision, carefully drafted problems, raising new issues for new
uses, will nearly always enhance the learning process. Problems
which are both pedagogically useful and useful to legal services
and other public interest attorneys will compound the benefits.
Creative research is worth exploiting, at least experimentally.
It would go to substance and not merely to the form of the law
school curriculum; it would be more responsive to legitimate student concerns. It would afford law teachers an opportunity to
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make more useful and valuable research contributions in areas
going to the root causes of racial and economic inequities, and in
a manner affording avenues of communication far beyond those
now provided by the pages of a law review. If nothing else, this
generation of law teachers might succeed in convincing this generation of law students that almost nothing in the law school curriculum is really "irrelevant."

